MDDE613+Unit+5

Unit 5: Dreams of Emancipation

Fay, B. (1987). **Situating critical social science, (pp. 10-26)**; The basic scheme of critical social science, (pp. 27-41); The politics of critical social science I, (pp. 85-116). In B. Fay, Critical social science: Liberation and its limits. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Humanist Variant
 * loosely be called a secularized version of the self-estrangement theory.
 * The basis of this variant is an enlarged view of the possibilities of human power and human reason to deal with the problems of human life. According to it, humans are not only capable of understanding who they are and what they need, they are further capable of organizing their affairs on the basis of this understanding so as to produce a satisfying existence. This enhanced conception of the capacities of humans to solve their own problems by themselves manifests itself in the idea that emancipation involves an intervention in the affairs of this world in order to alter the 'natural' course of things to make them more amenable to human satisfaction. An active, engaged posture is the appropriate one according to the humanist variant.
 * the humanist variant seeks a theory which will simultaneously //explain// the social world, //criticize// it, and //empower// its audience to overthrow it. (p.23)

The humanist variant envisions a theory which is capable of
 * interpreting in a cognitively respectable manner the social world in which we live
 * in such a way that this world's oppressiveness is apparent, and
 * in such a way that it empowers its listeners to change their lives.
 * reveal how a particular social order functions,
 * but also to show the ways it is fundamentally unsatisfactory to those who live in it, and
 * to do both of these things in such a manner that it itself becomes the moving force helping to transform this order into something radically different.

Critical social science = an endeavour to explain social life in general or some particular instance of it in a way that is
 * 1) Scientific, the provision of comprehensive explanations in terms of a few basic principles which are subject to public evidence
 * 2) Critical, the offering of a sustained negative evaluation of the social order on the basis of explicit and rationally supported criteria. By 'practical' I mean self-knowledge to serve as the basis for such a transformation
 * 3) Practical, the stimulation of some members of society identified by the theory to transform their social existence in specified ways through fostering in them a new self-knowledge to serve as the basis for such a transformation
 * 4) Non-idealistic, a theory which is not committed to the claims either
 * 5) that ideas are the sole determinant of behaviour (idealism I, sociological claim),
 * 6) that emancipation simply involves a certain sort of enlightenment (idealism II, therapeutic claim), (aka in order for people to alleviate their dissatisfaction, all they have to do is to change their ideas about who they are and what they are doing)
 * 7) that people are able and willing to change their self-understandings simply on the basis of rational argument (idealism III, psychological claim).

A science tells us what //**is**// the case, but a practical and critical science appears to tell us what //**ought**// to be the case. (p. 24)

Non-idealism is a defining element of the theory intended to fulfill the role for scientific knowledge envisioned by the humanist variant.

Modern critical science wishes to avoid being idealistic in any of the three senses.
 * It wishes to do so because such an idealism seems naive on the face of it, and a belief in it seems to condemn critical theories to the role of powerless, merely moralistic preaching.
 * An idealistic critical social science would picture suffering people as eager and able to transform their lives simply on the basis of a new account of them, and would portray their suffering as caused simply by their ignorance of themselves.
 * But we know that this is not the case.
 * often the suffering of people is caused by their domination by others;
 * often sufferers are not willing to consider alternative accounts of their experience, their needs, and their capacities; and
 * often when they are willing, indeed even when they do learn a new theory about themselves, they are unable to behave differently from before.
 * An idealistic science cannot face the problems of domination, resistance, and weakness of will, and it cannot face these problems because it denies the causal embeddedness of self-ignorance in concrete social structures.



Epiphenomena
 * A secondary phenomenon that results from and accompanies another: "Exploitation of one social class or ethnic group by another [is] an epiphenomenon of real differences in power between social groups."
 * An additional condition or symptom in the course of a disease, not necessarily connected with the disease.

Modern critical social science seeks to synthesize these positions by claiming (p. 25)
 * that ideas are a function of social conditions,
 * but also that they do in turn play a causal role in creating and sustaining particular social structures; and
 * by claiming that humans are amenable (accountable) to educative enlightenment and emancipation, but only under certain conditions and in certain ways.
 * In other words, it pictures the relationship between conditions and ideas not as unilinear but as dialectical (the art or practice of arriving at the truth by the exchange of logical arguments).

Fay, B. (1987). Situating critical social science, (pp. 10-26); **The basic scheme of critical social science, (pp. 27-41)**; The politics of critical social science I, (pp. 85-116). In B. Fay, Critical social science: Liberation and its limits. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Systemic Ignorance
 * taught from childhood and never allowed to see the difference, systemically taught a false idea that is never corrected.

False Consciousness
 * a Marxist theory that believes people are not consciously aware of oppression and other detrimental affairs. The inability for a person to fully comprehend a situation for what it truly is.

For a social theory to be critical and practical as well as scientifically explanatory, the conditions described in it must be met. It is only when this set of conditions occurs that a social science can be truly critical. Specifically, these are:
 * 1) there be a crisis in a social system;
 * 2) this crisis be at least in part caused by the false consciousness of those experiencing it;
 * 3) this false consciousness be amenable to the process of enlightenment I described; and
 * 4) such enlightenment lead to emancipation in which a group, empowered by its new-found self-understanding. radically alters its social arrangements and thereby alleviates its suffering.

A theory would have to offer
 * a critique of the self-understandings of the members of its audience;
 * an explanation of why these self-understandings, though in some sense false, continue to be employed by these members;
 * an account of why these understandings now can be undermined and how this can specifically be done in present circumstances;
 * an alternative interpretation of the identity—the capacities and real interests—of this audience;
 * a demonstration of the crisis nature of the workings of the society under discussion; and an identification of those aspects of this society which need to be changed if the crisis is to be resolved in a positive way for its audience.

By offering this complex set of analysis to the relevant group at the appropriate time in the appropriate setting, a social theory can legitimately hope not only to explain a social order but to do so in such a way that this order is overthrown.

A fully developed critical theory would comprise all of the following: I //A theory of false consciousness which (//explains the causes of the self-(mis)understandings of a group of people//)// > 1. demonstrates the ways in which the self-understandings of a group of people are false (in the sense of failing to account for the life experiences of the members of the group), or incoherent (because internally contradictory), or both. This is sometimes called an `ideology-critique'; **//interpretive//** (requires a specification of the meanings of the various self-understandings of a particular group) > 2. explains how the members of this group came to have these self-misunderstandings, and how they are maintained; > 3. contrasts them with an alternative self-understanding, showing how this alternative is superior. **//narrative-historical//** (historical story of how the members of a group came to have the self-understandings they have) II //A theory of crisis which (//explains the causes and nature of the crisis in which a social system is caught//)// > 4. spells out what a social crisis is; **//structural//** (demands a general picture of what a crisis in a social system is) > 5. indicates how a particular society is in such a crisis. This would require examining the felt dissatisfactions of a group of people and showing both that they threaten social cohesion and that they can not be alleviated given the basic organization of the society and the self-understandings of its members; **//functional//** (seeks an etiology [study of causes or origins] of the dissatisfactions of the members of a group which sees them as part of an ongoing system of social relations) > 6. provides an historical account of the development of this crisis partly in terms of the false consciousness of the members of the group and partly in terms of the structural bases of the society. III //A theory of education which (//explains the conditions sufficient for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory//)// > 7. offers an account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory; **//causal//** ( solicits a general causal account of the conditions sufficient for enlightenment); **//competence-theoretic//** in character (prescribes a theory designed to elucidate the capacities of rational human beings to reflect on and alter their character). > 8. shows that given the current social situation these conditions are satisfied. IV //A theory of transformative action which (//explains the conditions which must be altered if the social crisis is to be resolved in the requisite manner//)// > 9. isolates those aspects of a society which must be altered if the social crisis is to be resolved and the dissatisfactions of its members lessened; > 10. details a plan of action indicating the people who are to be the `carriers' of the anticipated social transformation and at least some general idea of how they might do this.

Fay, B. (1987). Situating critical social science, (pp. 10-26); The basic scheme of critical social science, (pp. 27-41); **The politics of critical social science I, (pp. 85-116)**. In B. Fay, Critical social science: Liberation and its limits. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Educative conception of theory and practice versus the Instrumentalist conception of Theory and Practice

Zweckrational (p. 86) aka Instrumentalist Account of theory and Practice
 * it is action instrumental toward achieving a chosen end on the basis of a rational calculation of the best means.

Educative Account of theory and Practice
 * is the educative conception of theory and practice. It is a conception which concentrates on social scientific theory.
 * social theory is seen as a means by which people can achieve a much clearer picture of who they are, and of what the real meaning of their social practices is, as a first step in becoming different sorts of people with different sorts of social arrangements
 * The purpose of scientific theory is to engender self-knowledge and so to liberate people from the oppressiveness of their social arrangements.

How does the educative conception envision theoretical knowledge as possessing this power?
 * According to it, oppressive and frustrating conditions exist at least partly because people are systematically ignorant about their needs and about the nature of their relationships and activities. By helping to remove this unclarity by revealing to people how their false pictures of themselves and their world are a contributory cause of their unhappiness, the educator intends to be the catalytic agent which sparks these people into changing the way they live and relate to others.

one can use particular causal processes, || but to transcend these processes ||
 * Contrasting Views** (p. 89)
 * **Instrumentalist** || **Educative** ||
 * knowledge does not increase the power of people by informing them how to achieve their ends by getting certain causal relationships to work for them || Rather, it is intended to free people from these causal relationships by getting them to have different ends. ||
 * the point of knowledge is not to provide the means by which
 * it is not to learn how to get what one wants, || but to learn how to have different wants ||
 * it is not knowledge of external variables in order to manipulate them, || but self-knowledge in order to be freed of them ||
 * it is not the ability to work with a system efficiently, || but the power to alter this system fundamentally ||

The educationists see the over-extension of a way of thinking which is appropriate to one sphere (the merely physical) but not to another (human social life), an over-extension which will produce a dehumanized humanity. They see this danger of dehumanization in two distinct ways: Behind both of these negative outcomes the educationists see the denial of what for them is the most important and most distinctive human characteristic, namely, the capacity for self-renewal generated by reflection.
 * Danger of Dehumanization** (p. 91)
 * 1) in the creation of an elitist world in which the many are manipulated by the few; and
 * 2) in the creation of a stagnant reified world, and therefore a world which continues in another form the self-estrangement of humans.

Criticisms (p. 91/2) 1. the instrumentalist conception will lead to a world of domination — 2. Educationists claim that the instrumentalist's world is a reified world, and hence an estranged one.
 * the educationist case points out that the instrumentalist conception is essentially manipulative.
 * It is rooted in the belief that there are certain sets of naturally recurring general regularities which can be used to achieve one's purposes by altering one set to effect another.
 * Social theory provides the basis for a social engineering with which one can rationally control objective social processes through the manipulation of people and the environment in which they operate.
 * Not only is the instrumentalist conception manipulative, but it is ordinarily (though not necessarily) authoritarian as well. This is so for two reasons.
 * 1) it requires that those who employ theoretical knowledge possess the requisite skills, and, since acquiring these calls for a specialized education, this encourages the emergence of a knowledgeable elite.
 * 2) it presupposes that those who are knowledgeable are in positions of power so that they can alter social conditions to control social and psychological processes.
 * To educationists this sort of social control is a form of domination because
 * it takes from the dominated their capacity to reflect on their situation and to alter their lives on the basis of this reflection.
 * it denies them their power of activity understood as the power to reorder their lives on the basis of new self-understandings and desires, the power to create and recreate the conditions of their existence. And the denial of this power is the denial of what makes them human: it turns them into merely natural beings whose behavior and social relationships are ultimately governed by fixed imperatives. Such is the condition of the slave when slavery is institutionalized in human societies, and it is precisely the condition of slavery in which educationists see the world when it is organized around the instrumentalist conception.
 * 'Reification' means 'making into a thing,' and it refers to taking what are essentially conventional activities and treating them as if they operated according to a given set of laws //independently// of the wishes of the social actors who engage in them. Perhaps mere things operate in this manner, the educationists assert, but humans do not, and to treat them as if they do is to turn them into things.
 * instrumentalist have an implicit assumption that the form of legitimate knowledge is nomological. For to assume that events in the human world can be explained nomologically is to assume that it is comprised of a set of regular, primitive relationships which hold under given circumstances; in just the same way it is assumed such a set holds in the natural world examined by modern natural science. Instrumentalists assume that the laws of social life have an independent power which can only be dealt with by ascertaining what these laws are and regulating actions accordingly.
 * nomological - the study and discovery of general physical and logical laws.
 * Reification is a perfect instance of self-estrangement, according to educationists.
 * people are giving to what are essentially the creations of their own activity a separate existence which holds sway over them and to which they have to give their obedience. And this, in turn, is for them to deny (undoubtedly unwittingly) that they have the power to alter their conventions if they desire to do so.
 * It is to deny, or at least to limit, their power of agency, that power which defines them as human beings. It does this by saying, in effect, that their society is a fixed entity in its basic outlines, or that it evolves in certain given ways, such that it cannot be other than it is.
 * People are dominated by (what they take to be) the basic patterns which govern their social life.

The educative conception is rooted in the belief that certain external conditions that produce suffering in people can have the causal force they do because these people are unaware that it is in part their conceptions of themselves which give these conditions their causal powers.(p. 95)

An action is unfree (as in the case of the consumer's compulsive behavior) when it is outside the agents' own rational self-control, which is to say, when it is not undertaken on the basis of the agents' own deliberation. And for this it is not enough that the action simply be caused, but rather that its causes be such that they do not include the agent's rational reflection and/or that they are immune to attempts to comprehend and alter them accordingly.(p. 97/8)
 * Example: this is just the situation with the consumers who were slaves to the advertisers: the advertisers caused the consumers to act in ways that were not their own because they acted as the result of processes of which they were unaware and which they were unable to comprehend given their own resources, processes which worked independently of their conscious thoughts and desires. Introducing the relevant considerations that made them understand what the advertising meant to them increased their freedom, because they were now able to cease being victims by taking control of their own responses. Now the causes of their behaviour included processes which were truly their own — and this is what freedom is.

**Problem of Resistance** - where the audience rejects its interpretation of their situation. (p. 98)
Problem 1, Critical theorists have to confront, not just a number of false beliefs, but false consciousness. These self-misunderstandings are usually shared by a whole group of people who have the same position in society or even by a whole community. They constitute an important element of the conceptual scheme in terms of which these people talk about themselves and their social world. Furthermore, they are illusions and not merely false ideas, meaning, in Freud's terms, that 'a wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in their motivation.' In other words, these self-misunderstandings are attempts to satisfy certain important needs and desires of the people who hold them, and this means they //have a great power in their psychological economy//.
 * False consciousness** involves systematic self-misunderstandings on the part of people
 * about their needs,
 * about what will make them happy, and
 * about the nature of their social relations.

Both these facts about false consciousness — its systematic, shared, and deep nature, as well as its being rooted in its holders' needs — combine to make any attempt at dislodging them extremely difficult. Giving up such illusions requires abandoning self-conceptions and the social practices they engender and support, things people cling to because they provide direction and meaning in their lives. It involves acquiring a new identity.

Problem 2, (p. 99) Critical science is founded on the assumption that certain conditions can cause certain beliefs. Consequently, it should anticipate that the illusions people have about themselves will be produced in them by their social order. Critical social scientists must be prepared for the situation in which the **people** to whom their theories are directed **are genuinely unable to consider their novel and strange-sounding interpretations**, given the kind of social arrangements under which they live and the kind of social experience they have had.

Critical theorists have been aware of the problem of resistance and have developed a number of strategies (three will be given) in order to solve it.
 * 1) Insist that their critical theory be made accessible to its audience by grounding it in their own selfunderstandings.
 * 2) Providing an ideology-critique of the audiences' self-understandings.
 * A demonstration of exactly in what ways the ideologies of the social actors are illusions.
 * ideology-critique is not purely a negative activity,
 * for it not only seeks to point out the error in a people's self-understandings and
 * the way this error helps to maintain a social order which is thwarting to them;
 * it also attempts to reveal the truth which these self-understandings contain,
 * by uncovering their hidden meanings and
 * by making explicit the new self-conception they implicitly contain.
 * It is by providing an alternative which speaks to the disguised but real meaning underlying the (illusory) self-understandings of its audience that a critical theory hopes to overcome their resistance to the new conception of themselves and their situation that it proffers.
 * 1) Ideas and self-understandings may be illusions which are necessary in order to sustain a particular form of living.
 * a critical theory must offer an account which shows that the social structure can be altered in ways which will undermine the appropriateness of the (false) ideologies which the people in this situation presently possess

Distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions to be met before education can occur. (p. 103) In the modified educative conception, the creation of conditions to effect a social transformation is confined to those conditions which are //necessary//, whereas in the instrumentalist model the engineer produces those conditions which are //necessary and sufficient//. > S={a, b, c, d, ....} elements are necessary> A is a subset of S> A={a, b, f, g} elements are necessary and sufficient (if and only if)

It is absolutely essential for critical theorists to develop as part of their general theories an analysis of the conditions under which a people can become clear to themselves.(This is the role of sub-theory no. 7 of the basic scheme.) This is so for three reasons.
 * One of the jobs of critical science is to investigate **other, more recondite causal conditions** of a social, psychological, or physiological kind which are necessary for people to open themselves to critiques that try to account for the unhappiness of their lives.
 * Also, for CT the role of the theory is to lead through **reflection** to a change in the self-understandings of a group of people, and from there to an alteration of their social world.
 * The heart of the educative approach is reflection. (p. 103)
 * BUT reflection is not //necessary and sufficient// for Instrumentalists. (I am not sure if this is correct, just my thoughts.)
 * Eric Berolow (TEDTalks) notes that in order to predict effects, one must consider the entire system in all of its complexity and then hone in on the sphere of influence that matters most, most times it's often very local to the 'node' you care about--within one or two degrees. [[image:Unit_5,_Sphere_if_influence,_Eric_Berlow.jpg width="560" height="256" link="@http://www.ted.com/talks/eric_berlow_how_complexity_leads_to_simplicity.html"]]


 * 1) Since a critical theory is one whose whole point is to be translated into enlightened action, such a theory must develop an account of the conditions which must be met if people are to be in a position actually to consider it as a possible account of their lives.
 * 2) CTs must predict how its audience will react to its message, and thus they must know how they are to inspire their audience to transformative action. A necessary condition to keep this test of truth operational is a theory of the conditions which must be satisfied for it to be the case that an audience can consider the critical theory under question. Otherwise, there is no way of distinguishing between,
 * on the one hand, genuine rejections of a theory — rejections which disconfirm it — and,
 * on the other, the ignorant and unthinking responses of people unable to consider the theory, responses which can be discounted when assessing the worth of the theory.
 * 1) To prevent a critical theory from degenerating into pure instrumentalism.
 * For if one is unable to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate rejections of one's theory, any rejection of the theory by its audience can then be interpreted as indicating that its rejecters must continue to be manipulated in an instrumentalist manner—for which read: drugged; coerced by imposed laws; kept in prison, etc.—until they are supposedly 'rational enough' to respond to the theory in a reflective and coherent way, for which read: until they accept the critical theorist's analysis of their situation.
 * A major danger for anyone who aspires to alter the way people think, feel, and act is dogmatism degenerating into tyranny. One way that critical theory distinguishes itself from mere dogmatism is its setting out of conditions which, if met, would show the theory to be false.

All critical theorists need to include: (p. 105)- a theory of education which offers a general account of the conditions needed for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory.

Mezirow, J. (1995). Transformation theory of adult learning. In M. Welton (Ed.), In defense of the lifeworld: Critical perspectives on adult learning (pp. 39-70). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
 * Educative Enlightenment and Revolutionary Social Change**

Presentational Construal


 * apprehension, making meaning without using language and does not involve an internal dialogue.
 * we construe the real shape and size of something from its apparent shape and size; the total temporal form of a process from its serial occurrences; a distinctive presence or entity from its unique signature of form and movement
 * involve our sense of directionality, movement, entity, event punctuation (when an event begins and ends), colour, style, texture, light and dark, sound, our feelings, physiological reactions, physical balance, kinaesthetic awareness, recognition, empathy, and identification with others—all these extremely important dimensions of knowing are involved in making meaning without the direct and immediate use of language categories or words.
 * functions of presentational construal including:
 * judging immediate physical sensation, as when we learn to ski or ride a bike;
 * inspiration, like our feelings at beholding great beauty or great virtue;
 * aesthetic judgment, as when we perceive a flaw in design or a discrepancy between form and context;
 * love, as joyful awareness of the essential worth of any aspect of life or life itself;
 * acts of conscience, as when we spontaneously act upon our feelings regarding right and wrong;
 * reality recognition, as when we recognize that we are in a play, game or dream;
 * intuition, as when a decision about to be taken just does not feel right;
 * non-verbal play, as when we play with a dog and a stick;
 * solidarity, a feeling of oneness with others;
 * transcendence, as when we identify with a cause larger than ourselves about which we feel strongly or feel a sense of oneness with humanity or with God.
 * Feelings in presentational construal become emotions in propositional construal. Emotions influence propositional construal by helping us to remember by giving weight to what we learn and by motivating us to take action.
 * Our value decisions are seldom judgments involving reflection and rational discourse (even with ourselves); they are spontaneous projections of assimilated symbols with which we make meaning through presentational construal--we may acquire the values in the first place through intentional construal.

Prepositional Construal


 * tacitly experiencing things learned, using language categories and words to make meaning.

Intentional Construal


 * when we are deliberately attempting to pose or solve a problem, describe or explain.
 * involves purposeful awareness of our use of logic, inference, analysis, reflection, evaluation, and the giving and assessing of reasons through rational discourse.
 * We engage in intentional construal when propositional or presentational construal becomes problematic.
 * Intentional construal involves either internal and/or external dialogues.
 * Intentional construal is required to transform our meaning schemes and perspectives. We do this through reflection, understood here as an apperceptive assessment of the justification for our beliefs, ideas, or feelings.

Meaning Perspective


 * involves a set of psychocultural assumptions, for the most part culturally assimilated but including intentionally learned theories, that serve as one of three sets of codes significantly shaping sensation and delimiting perception and cognition:
 * sociolinguistic, (e.g., social norms, cultural and language codes, ideologies, theories),
 * psychological (e.g., repressed parental prohibitions which continue to block ways of feeling and acting, personality traits) and
 * epistemic (e.g., learning, cognitive and intelligence styles, sensory learning preferences, focus on wholes or parts).
 * (Note to self, later papers include moral-ethical, philosophical, and aesthetic)
 * significantly influence and delimit the horizons of our expectations.

Meaning Scheme


 * These abstract, paradigmatic meaning perspectives become articulated in a meaning scheme—the specific set of beliefs, knowledge, judgment, attitude, and feeling which shape a particular interpretation, as when we think of an Irishman, a cathedral, a grandmother, or a conservative or when we express a point of view, an ideal or a way of acting.


 * Meaning are specific belief systems.

Implicit versus Tacit (link)
 * Implicit knowledge: Stuff we can surface and articulate through reflection, observation and dialog. This may be distinctions, categories, mental models that we have not written down or explicated in coversation before, but we can recall and dredge our memory or past experiences to provide the rational, the decisions or context. An important class of implicit knowledge is heuristics - personal rules of thumb that we have developed to cope with situations and to speed decisions.
 * Tacit knowledge: Is 'what we do not know we know', deep thoughts, intuition, feelings, fine motor skills and competencies, we either take for granted or have not discovered (recognized) we posess. Quite often tacit knowledge is tied to the environment, buried in the relationships or culture within which we operate. Another way to find tacit knowledge is to look to actions / objects and beliefs we 'know but cannot tell'.
 * Simply - if you are persistent, you can / will uncover implicit knowledge or come very close to articulating and representing it. Tacit knowledge, however, is always buried, yet it is the foundation for most of our actions, decisions, feelings and personal identity.



Criticisms of Transformative Learning Theory

Frame of Reference


 * Meaning perspectives and meaning schemes are the structures of meaning. Both operate propositionally, presentationally, and intentionally to provide the frame of reference within which we engage in intentional learning.
 * Meaning schemes and perspectives selectively shape and delimit expectation, perception and cognition by predisposing our intentions and purposes, that is, setting our line of action. We have a strong tendency to reject ideas which fail to fit our preconceptions by labelling them aberrations, nonsense, weird, or mistaken.
 * Learners can be assisted to become more aware of frames of references—their own and others'—identify assumptions and presuppositions, assess evidence, weigh arguments, become more openminded, and improve the quality of their participation in discourse. (p. 60)

Discourse (p. 53)


 * When we communicate or have doubts about the truth or authenticity of the assertion, the truthfulness of the speaker, or the appropriateness of what is asserted in light of relevant norms, we often seek the best judgment of the most informed, objective, and rational persons we can find. We engage them in a special form of dialogue which Habermas refers to as "discourse."
 * involves an effort to set aside bias, prejudice, and personal concerns and to do our best to be open and objective in presenting and assessing reasons and reviewing the evidence and arguments for and against the problematic assertion to arrive at a consensus.

Assumptions of rational discourse. (Even the most extreme postmodernist writers who argue that universal concepts of rationality and discourse are impossible, implicitly accept these universal "rules" in advancing their viewpoint.) (p. 54)


 * 1) beliefs should contain no logical contradictions,
 * 2) reasons for believing them can be advanced and assessed,
 * 3) concepts will become more intelligible when analyzed and
 * 4) we have criteria with which to know when the belief is justified or not.

The criteria by which a viewpoint or belief is justified through discourse include the degree to which it is inclusive, differentiating, permeable (open to other viewpoints), and integrative of experience. Under ideal conditions of discourse, implicit in the nature of human communication, participants will:


 * 1) have accurate and complete information,
 * 2) be free from coercion and distorting self-deception,
 * 3) be able to weigh evidence and assess arguments objectively,
 * 4) be open to alternative points of view, that is, to care about the way others think and feel,
 * 5) be able to become critically reflective upon assumptions and presuppositions and their consequences,
 * 6) have equal opportunity to participate in the various roles of discourse, and
 * 7) be willing to accept an informed, objective, and rational consensus as a legitimate test of validity until new perspectives, evidence, or arguments are encountered and are subsequently established through discourse as yielding better judgments. (p. 54)

There is no question of the claim that dialogue is often made impossible in a society structured by power and inequality and that creating a forum in which participants have the right to speak is inadequate.


 * It is not just fear of retribution which keeps individuals from marginalized groups from participating.
 * People are silenced by being demoralized, unable to believe that what they have to say will be valued, having been previously silenced, frustrated, or made insecure by contesting ideas.
 * Assertive challenges of beliefs or evidence can impede further dialogue.
 * Awareness of being less articulate than others can be an impediment to full participation.
 * Participants may be silenced by the belief that discourse cannot make a difference in resolving a problem.
 * One upsmanship, personal competitiveness, bias and prejudice, and past experiences with oppression and domination can suffocate communication.
 * Dialogue can be aborted by deep differences in language, culture, and meaning perspective. However, Burbules and Rice note: "There is no reason to assume that dialogue across differences involves either eliminating those differences or imposing one group's views on others; dialogue that leads to understanding, cooperation, and accommodation can sustain differences within a broader compact of toleration and respect"

Despite the diverse ways that power and influence distort dialogue, **transformation theory holds that dialogue and discourse can proceed in a critically self-reflective manner that aims toward more sensitive, respectful, non-dominating, and non-distorting communication.** Burbules and Rice call "communicative virtues," and Siegel (1992) calls "the critical spirit," which help make dialogue possible and sustainable over time. These virtues include


 * tolerance,
 * patience,
 * respect for differences,
 * a willingness to listen,
 * the inclination to admit that one may be mistaken,
 * the ability to reinterpret or translate one's own concerns in a way that makes them comprehensive to others,
 * the self-imposition of restraint in order that others may have a turn to speak, and
 * the disposition to express oneself honestly and sincerely.

The possession of these virtues influences one's capacities both to express one's own beliefs, values and feelings accurately, and to listen to and hear those of others. Ideal conditions of and the communicative virtues are also the ideal conditions and requisite virtues of collaborative adult learning. They constitute the goals of an adult education which places a major emphasis on collaborative learning. These ideal conditions and communicative virtues also imply a set of social values and preconditions which must pertain if adults are to be permitted to explore fully the meaning of their experience. (p. 57)


 * The implicit values include participatory democracy, tolerance, freedom, education, equality of opportunity.
 * Preconditions would include a good formal education, and at least adequate safety, health, shelter, and economic security to assure equal opportunity to participate, think, and reason with others.

Action (P. 58/59)


 * indispensable phase of the process of adult learning.
 * But action can mean
 * making a decision,
 * being critically reflective
 * transforming a meaning structure as well as a change in behaviour.

---Hart, Instrumental Rationality


 * Practical reasoning that helps a person decide how to do things (efficiently perform technical tasks, resolve conflicts, solve problems, etc.) by regarding the factors involved in a situation as variables to be controlled.
 * The dominant mode of thinking in the industrial world, instrumental rationality lacks any notion of limits and has led to the creation of the modern technological infrastructure.